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SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT. By Wayne R. LaFave. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. "1978. 
Pp. XXV, 716; xv, 778; xiii, 804. $180.00. 
The exclusionary rule cannot succeed "if the law it is designed to 
enforce is tentative, flexible, and self-consciously oriented to 
facts." 1 
For the first time, search and seizure has been reviewed, analyti-
cally dissected, and exhaustively annotated with both state and fed-
eral decisions. In the preface to his masterful treatise, Search and 
Seizure:· A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, Professor LaFave 
leaves it for others to judge how well he has succeeded in fashioning 
a "systematic and comprehensive analysis of the entire range of con-
temporary Fourth Amendment issues."2 Now, more than a year af-
ter the book's publication, we can begin to review LaFave's 
contribution to the fourth amendment analysis "in the round rather 
than the flat [in order to] gain some understanding of the whole in 
action.''3 With this review, I hope to convince the reader that 
LaFave's three-volume treatise is an invaluable aid for confronting 
the myriad legal problems raised under the fourth amendment. 
That there is a need for a single comprehensive treatise on the 
fourth amendment cannot be seriously doubted. During the two de-
cades since the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio,4 we have 
witnessed a virtual flood of decisions and commentary on search and 
seizure. In Mapp, of course, the Supreme Court rendered its 
landmark ruling that the fourth amendment, applicable to the states 
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 5 must 
l. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures'~· The Robinson 
J)i/emma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 162 (citing Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth 
Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 365 (1973)). 
2. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT vii 
(1978) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as SEARCH AND SEIZURE]. 
3. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION - DECIDING APPEALS 263 (1960), cited 
in 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE at viii, and LaFave, Probable Cause from I,!formants: The Effect of 
Murphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. I, I. 
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
5. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides "nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
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be enforced by state courts through the same sanction applied in the 
federal courts: the exclusion of illegally seized evidence. Following 
Mapp and its Supreme Court progeny,6 however, the host of state 
and lower federal court decisions addressing the fourth amendment7 
has been more than matched by a profusion of critical commentary. 8 
Since Mapp, as LaFave has aptly observed, "[t]he confirmed Fourth 
Amendment buff is never in want of grist for his mill."9 
As the sole author of Search and Seizure, 10 LaFave brings a 
wealth of experience to his task. Beginning his legal career shortly 
after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, LaFave 
first taught criminal law at Villanova University and later moved to 
the University of Illinois, where he is now a full professor. During 
these years, he has written extensively on general topics in the field 
of criminal law, 11 including the highly respected casebook that he 
coauthored with Professors Yale Kamisar and Jerold Israel. 12 In ad-
6. For some of the Supreme Court's more recent decisions addressing the substantive ele-
ments of the fourth amendment, see, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Arkan-
sas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Lo-Ji Sales, 
Inc. v. New York; 442 U.S. 319 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.200 (1979); Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Massachusetts v. White, 439 U.S. 280 (1979); Mincey v. Ari-
zona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Chime! v. California, 395 
U.S. 752 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 
543 (1968); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Superior Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967). 
7. Any attempt to cite all of the numerous state and federal court opinions dealing with 
search and seizure would be unproductive, if not unwieldy. In Colorado alone, at least 125 
appellate opinions addressing the fourth amendment have been issued since 1972. 
It should be noted, however, that recent Supreme Court opinions have sharply limited the 
reach of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States 
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
8. As with case law, the volume of critical commentary on the fourth amendment is so 
large that citation is not warranted. Indeed, it may well be true that more words have been 
written about the fourth amendment than all of the rest of the Bill of Rights taken together. 
See I SEARCH AND SEIZURE at v. 
9. LaFave, "Case by Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures''.· The Robinson 
JJilemma, supra note I, at 127. 
10. Other books written by LaFave include J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCE· 
DURE IN A NUTSHELL (1975); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1974); W. LAFAVE, ARREST (1965); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL 
LAW (1972). 
II. See, e.g., J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL (1975); 
LaFave, Penal Code Revision: Considering the Problems and Practices of the Police, 45 TEXAS 
L. REV. 434 (1976); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making 
and Reviewing Law Eeforcement .Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987 (1965); LaFave, The Police 
and Noneeforcement of the Law (pts. 1-2), 1962 Wis. L. REV. 104, 179; LaFave, Book Review, 6 
YILL. L. REV. 438 (1961) (reviewing J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 
1960)). 
12. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1974). 
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dition, LaFave has participated actively in the American Bar Associ-
ation Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 13 where 
he was the official reporter for the Advisory Committee on the Crim-
inal Trial. 14 And yet, his most significant work has been in the area 
of search and seizure. He has authored numerous articles addressing 
different aspects of the subject, 15 many of which have provided a 
·foundation for sections in his treatise. 16 In this regard, it may be 
sufficient to note that LaFave is widely held by his colleagues to be 
the "reigning expert on. the law of s_earch and seizure."17 
The book's three volumes provide a comprehensive review of the 
field. 18 In volume one, LaFave offers the reader an extended discus-
13. The American Bar Association Standards have been revised and are now designated as 
the American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration ef Criminal Justice. 
14. See AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARD·s RELATING TO 
TRIAL BY JURY (1968). 
15. See W. LAFAVE, ARREsT (1965); LaFave, Probable Causeftom Informants: The Ejfect 
ef Murphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, supra note 3; LaFave, "Case-by-Case 
Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson .bilemma, supra note l; 
LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into the "Quagmire,'' 
8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9 (1972); LaFave, "Street Encounters and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, 
Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 39 (1968); LaFave, Administrative Searches and the 
Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. l; LaFave, Search and 
Seizure: "The Course ef True Law • .. Has Not . .. Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255; 
LaFave, .Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis ef Current Practices, 1962 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 331. 
16. Compare LaFave, Probable Cause from Informants: The Ejfect ef Murphy's Law on 
Fourth Amendment Adjudication, supra note 3, with 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE at 499; LaFave, 
"Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures'~· The Robinson .Dilemma, 
supra note 1, with 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE at 262; LaFave, Warrantless Seaches and the 
Supreme Court; Further Ventures Into the "Quagmire," supra note 15, with 2 SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE at 408; LaFave, "Street Encounters: and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and 
Beyond, supra note 15, with 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE at 2; LaFave, Administrative Searches and 
the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, supra note 14, with 3 SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE at 176. 
17. See the foreword to LaFave, Warran/less Searches and the Supreme Court: Further 
Ventures Into the "Quagmire," supra note 15, at 9. The high regard with which the appellate 
bench holds Professor LaFave is amply demonstrated by reference to some of the major crimi-
nal law decisions from the United States Supreme Court that cite his writings. See, e.g., 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S.Ct. 348 n.3, 351 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); 
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 
(1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 22 
(1977); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449 (1976); United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 888 (1975); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); Goodling v. United States, 
416 U.S. 430, 464 (1974); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 438 (1971) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 448 (1966). 
18. As of this writing, Professor LaFave has published a 1980 supplement to Search and 
Seizure and has announced his intention to ensure that the treatise reflects current case law 
and commentary. It should be noted, however, that LaFavc docs not attempt to cover the 
particular requirements for eavesdropping and wiretapping that are imposed by Title III of the 
Crime Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). This restriction is sensible, for, as 
LaFave points out, complete analysis on this topic would require a separate volume in and of 
itself. See, e.g., J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1977); NATIONAL WIRE-
TAPPING COMMISSION, ELECTRONIC ,SURVEILLANCE (1976). 
454 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:451 
sion of the origins of the exclusionary rule, its purposes and its alter-
natives. Of more value to the bench and bar, perhaps, is the 
thorough analysis of the arguments advanced by critics of the exclu-
sionary rule19 and the responses proffered by the rule's supporters.20 
As a companion to the introductory chapter on the exclusionary rule, 
volume one also includes a lengthy chapter entitled "Protected Areas 
and Interests." Given the rationale advanced by the Supreme Court 
in Katz v. United States21 - that the fourth amendment's guarantees 
apply only in cases where the victim has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy - this chapter provides the keystone for further analysis of 
search and seizure law. The volume concludes with an extended dis-
cussion of the requirements for determining probable cause to arrest. 
In volume two, LaFave continues with a detailed analysis of the 
requirements for securing search warrants. Due to the often pica-
yune and technical requirements applied in this area, the law sur-
rounding the issuance of search warrants has become particularly 
complex and has generated much litigation.22 Volume two also in-
cludes chapters on searches of persons, premises, and vehicles, to-
gether with a chapter on consent searches. 
The concluding volume of Search and Seizure considers adminis-
trative searches as well as the requirements for a stop and frisk, an 
area of search and seizure law that has generated much contro-
versy.23 In addition, the volume devotes several hundred pages to a 
detailed discussion of the administration of the exclusionary rule, in-
cluding the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on stand-
ing and attenuation. 21 This last section will prove particularly useful 
19. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Kaplan, 
Tire Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974); Taft, Protecting the Public 
.from Mapp v. Ohio Without Amending the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815 (1964). 
20. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 1, Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fffly Stales, 
1962 DUKE L.J. 319; Paulson, Tire Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM, 
L. C. & P. S. 255 (1971). ' 
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
22. In Colorado there have been numerous appellate decisions focusing on the technical 
requirements for a warrant. See, e.g., People v. Muniz, - Col.-, 597 P.2d 580 (1979); People 
v. Ragulsky, 184 Colo. 86, 518 P.2d 286 (1974); People v. Leahy, 173 Colo. 339, 484 P.2d 778 
(1970); People v. Royse, 173 Colo. 254,477 P.2d 380 (1970). 
23. The Supreme Court of Colorado, for example, has upheld the validity of a field inves-
tigation based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that an individual has commited or is 
about to commit a crime. These stops, called Stone stops, after Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 
485 P.2d 495 (1971), have been the subject of much disagreement. See, e.g., People v. Tooker, 
- Colo.-, 601 P.2d 1388, 1390 (1979) (Erickson, J., dissenting); People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 
144, 544 P.2d 392 (1975) (Erickson, J., dissenting); People v. Montoya, 190 Colo. 111, 543 P.2d 
514 (1975) (Erickson, J., dissenting). 
24. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 43? U.S. 128 (1978) (passengers in an automobile do not 
have standing to contest an illegal search and seizure where no possessory interest is shown), 
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to both trial and appellate judges. 
Although LaFave's treatise is to be commended for its breadth of 
coverage, it must receive more praise for its cogency of analysis. 
Typically, the role of the treatise has b_een to present the reader with 
the state of the law as it stands at the time of publication;25 it has 
remained for the law reviews to wage the campaign to fill in the 
interstitial gaps where the law has not been settled. When dealing 
with the fourth amendment, however, this would be particularly in-
appropriate. More than any other area of the law, search and seizure 
law is rapidly evolving and especially in need of reasoned guidance. 
For all but the most settled topics under the fourth amendment, 
Search and Seizure first provides the reader with a careful explana-
tion of the relevant case holdings (using lower court opinions where 
necessary) and then offers the reader a sampling of the philosophical 
debate underlying the case law. In addition, LaFave usually sets 
forth his own viewpoint, often buttressing it with the theories of 
other commentators. 
For example, after first setting out the Supreme Court cases con-
sidering the constitutional validity of the police practice called "stop 
and frisk,"26 the text reviews the question of whether probable cause, 
as it is construed under the warrant requirement, should be required 
to justify a stop and frisk.27 Analysis begins with the leading case of 
Terry v. Ohio28 and Chief Justice Burger's opinion suggesting that 
probable cause is only required in those cases where a warrant is 
required.29 LaFave argues that the Chief Justice's point is not well 
founded: "This approach seems to assume that a lesser quantum of 
evidence may suffice when an officer is acting without a warrant be-
cause he is so acting and thus has escaped the reach of the probable 
cause half of the amendment."30 To support his view, the author 
cites Justice Douglas's rejoinder to the Chief Justice,31 which at-
tacked the position that the police have greater authority to make a 
search and seizure than a judge has to authorize such action. 32 Tak-
25. See, e.g., w. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 
1979), which, its preface points out, is designed to present the law as currently interpreted by 
the various courts with little attempt "to examine the philosophy of the changes of constitu-
tional concept." 
26. 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE at 2-11. 
27. Id. at 11-15. 
28. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
29. 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE at 11. 
30. Id. (emphasis in original). 
31. Id. 
32. LaFave states: "This round should be awarded to Justice Douglas, as it is unmistaka-
456 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 78:4S1 
ing the argument one step further, however, LaFave next considers 
Justice Douglas's argument that the constitutional requirement of 
probable cause remains the same regardless of the degree of police 
intrusion:33 
This, of course, amounts to a rejection of the best-reasoned analysis in 
support of stop and frisk. In brief, this analysis proceeds as follows: 
The requirement of probable cause is a compromise for accommodat-
ing the opposing interests of the public in crime prevention and detec-
tion, and of individuals in privacy and security. The same compromise 
is not called for in all situations, and thus this balancing process should 
take account of precisely what lies in the balance in a given case. Be-
cause one variable is the degree of imposition on the individual, it may 
be postulated that less evidence is needed to meet the probable cause 
test when the consequences for the individual are less serious. Thus, it 
may be said that a brief on-the-street seizure does not require as much 
evidence of probable cause as one which involves taking the individual 
to the station, as the former is relatively short, less conspicuous, less 
humiliating to the person, and offers less chance for police coercion 
than the latter. Similarly, it could be concluded that patting down for 
weapons, although it is a search, is a lesser imposition than a complete 
search of the person and the area within his control.34 
Although the reader may disagree with LaFave's analysis at this 
juncture, it is clear that he has successfully melded the case law with 
the differing philosophies that sustain the dynamic tensions in the 
law of search and seizure. Other examples could be readily cited.35 
Ultimately, the test of any treatise lies in its usefulness to a broad 
spectrum of readers; Search and Seizure scores high marks in all cat-
egories. For the bench, this treatise provides a wealth of critical in-
formation on the scope of the fourth amendment. In my view, the 
publication of this treatise is a service to every appellate judge who 
faces a fourth amendment issue. For the bar, Search and Seizure 
contains an added dimension. In addition to providing an excellent 
research tool, the book will also be invaluable for citation to the 
court as persuasive authority. Finally, the student of the law may 
well profit from consulting LaFave. Although the treatise is too 
comprehensive to serve as a classroom text, it will certainly be useful 
for the student who wishes to delve further into the complexities of 
the fourth amendment. In short, Professor LaFave's Search and 
Seizure deserves accolades from all sides. 
bly clear that the Court has repeatedly held that police may not act upon less evidence merely 
by avoiding the magistrate." Id. at 11-12, 
33. Id. at 12. 
34. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
3S. The reader is particularly directed to LaFave's discussion of the criticisms made of the 
exclusionary rule in I SEARCH AND SEIZURE at 20. 
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My faith in the treatise is manifested by the fact that I patterned 
a bench book for the Colorado judiciary, which I coauthored with 
Judge William Neighbors, on the same outline that Professor 
LaFave has provided in his text. There are numerous references to 
Search and Seizure in each section of the bench book.36 In my view, 
this treatise will be the key to research on fourth amendment issues 
for many years to come. No law library should be without it. 
William H. Erickson 
Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of Colorado 
36. W. ERICKSON & w. NEIGHBORS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1979) (copies available from 
the Colorado Judicial Department). 
